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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DOES THE BATTLE OVER MANDATORY ARBITRATION
JEOPARDIZE THE EEOC’S WAR IN FIGHTING WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION?

I. INTRODUCTION
Carol Adams, an African-American, began working as an executive
assistant at Frank’s Nursery and Crafts (Frank’s) in 1993.1 When her boss left
in 1995, Adams was not offered a new executive assistant position that had
been created.2 Instead, this position was offered to a Caucasian woman who
was an outside applicant.3 Management did not give Adams the opportunity to
submit a formal application for this position.4 She filed a complaint with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that she had
been passed over for the position because of her race.5 The EEOC investigated
the matter and concluded that Frank’s had discriminated against Adams. The
EEOC determined that Frank’s could not establish any valid reason why
Adams was not qualified for the position.6 It decided to file charges under
Title VII.7 The EEOC’s case appeared to be strong. However, Adams, like all
employees at Frank’s, signed an arbitration agreement mandating that she
would settle all disputes arising out of her employment through arbitration.8
Frank’s moved to dismiss the EEOC’s claim and to compel Adams to arbitrate,
pursuant to this arbitration agreement.9
Adam’s situation raised several issues that had not been addressed by any
court. Should the EEOC have the ability to file a court claim on Adams’
behalf notwithstanding her agreement to arbitrate? If so, should the EEOC
have the ability to pursue all remedies, although Adams could gain individual
relief through arbitration? It seems that these questions could be answered
very simply through litigation. However, courts have demonstrated difficulty
1. EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 452 (6th Cir. 1999).
2. See id. at 453.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 453.
7. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-332, 78 Stat. 259 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). Title VII prohibits employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. Id.
8. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 452-53.
9. See id. at 453.
1155
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in resolving precisely what the EEOC’s role should be in fighting workplace
discrimination when an employee has signed a binding arbitration agreement.10
In 1998, employment discrimination claims were filed twenty-five times
more often than in 1970.11 Presently, the increase in employment claims is
approximately 100% greater than the increase in all other types of civil
litigation.12 With the enormous growth in employment discrimination claims,
there is an understandable fear that these claims will clog the federal courts,
and create a backlog for the EEOC.13 Backlog is already a problem, and the
number of claims continues to rise.14 It is for this reason that many employers
have attempted to use other mechanisms to resolve employment discrimination
claims. One popular alternative to litigation is to require that each employee
sign a binding arbitration agreement.15 Often, these agreements provide that an
employee is required to submit any claims arising from employment to an
arbitrator, in lieu of litigating the claim.16 Arbitration has allowed for an
expansion in the kinds of claims that may be resolved, and also provides a
forum to resolve disputes outside the judicial process and without the EEOC.17
Employers are able to use the less costly and more efficient arbitration process

10. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 452. Compare EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d
805 (4th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co. 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998). These cases
illustrate the circuit split that will be discussed throughout this Comment.
11. Evan J. Spelfogel, Mandatory Arbitration vs. Employment Litigation, 54 DISP. RESOL. J.
78 (1999).
12. See id. at 78.
13. See also Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise? 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 2 (1998).
14. See Spelfogel, supra note 11, at 78. Spelvogel notes that “There is currently a backlog
of over 50,000 employment discrimination cases at the EEOC and thousands more at state and
local government agencies.” Id.
15. See Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration, 52 DISP. RESOL. J.
8 (1997). The popularity of arbitration agreements has become quite evident in many areas. The
rise of arbitration has been seen in private schools arbitrating with students, and businesses
arbitrating with clients, as well as arbitration in employment. Id. at 10.
16. See Susan A. FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, 1 EMPLOYEE RTS. &
EMPLOYMENT POL’Y J. 221, 226 (1997).
17. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
This was the first Supreme Court case to hold that statutory claims, not just contractual claims,
could be arbitrated in a workplace context. Id. at 640. See also John W.R. Murray, The
Uncertain Legacy of Gilmer: Mandatory Arbitration of Federal Employment Discrimination
Claims, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281, 295-96 (1999). A benefit of arbitration over the judicial
process is that claims that may not be pursued by the EEOC in court proceedings because they are
considered relatively insignificant, involving only one employee or isolated incidents, will be
heard in an arbitration proceeding. Id. at 296-97.
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in almost any work-related claim, making these agreements valuable and
explaining their growth in popularity among employers.18
With the current expansion of arbitration in the workplace, courts have
attempted to determine the validity and utility of various arbitration
agreements.19 Without an arbitration agreement, when an employee wishes to
file a complaint claiming discrimination, the enforcement of the claim is
delegated to the EEOC by statute.20 However, when an employee has signed a
binding arbitration agreement, the role of the EEOC changes. In Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme Court held that binding
mandatory arbitration agreements are enforceable with regard to employment
discrimination claims.21 The Court’s holding in Gilmer is important because it
answered several questions relating to the role of the EEOC and the position
arbitration should play in employment discrimination disputes.22
While explaining that arbitration agreements are enforceable regarding
employment discrimination claims, the Gilmer majority did not discuss the
extent to which a binding arbitration agreement prevents the EEOC from
bringing a claim to a judicial forum.23 When there is no arbitration agreement,
the EEOC may seek a variety of equitable and legal remedies through
litigation.24 However, the effect of a binding arbitration agreement on the
EEOC’s authority to pursue all statutory remedies is unclear.
There has generally been agreement that the EEOC may seek equitable
relief on behalf of the public interest, notwithstanding a binding arbitration

18. See Spelfogel, supra note 11, at 80. Spelvogel notes, “[I]n the past several years, more
than 40 well-known employers have set up mandatory arbitration programs covering over two
million employees.” Id. at 81.
19. See Samuel Estreicher, PreDispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
Claims, 72 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1344, 1344 (1997).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). A litigant must first gain a right to sue by
filing a charge with the EEOC. The EEOC then investigates the claim. If the EEOC believes that
discrimination took place, it may prosecute the claim in its own name, or it may allow an
individual claimant to pursue the claim on his or her own behalf. Id.
21. See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). See also
infra notes 118-45 and accompanying text (discussing the Gilmer decision).
22. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
23. See EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 461 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32). Although the Gilmer majority stated that an individual claimant could
still file charges with the EEOC notwithstanding a binding arbitration agreement, it did not
discuss which remedies would be available to the EEOC pursuant to its authority. See Frank’s
Nursery, 177 F.3d at 461.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The EEOC may seek injunctive relief, reinstatement of the
employee into his or her former position, or a comparable position. Additionally, the EEOC may
seek monetary damages, including back pay and/or punitive relief on behalf of the employee
claiming discrimination. See id.
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agreement.25 However, a disagreement has developed regarding whether the
EEOC is able to recover damages on an employee’s behalf. The Second and
Fourth Circuits agree that the EEOC is precluded from seeking a monetary
remedy on behalf of an individual who has signed a binding arbitration
agreement.26 The Sixth Circuit, however, reached the opposite conclusion,
holding that the EEOC may exercise its delegated authority to pursue all
remedies, including monetary damages on an employee’s behalf.27 The EEOC
typically argues that because Congress has delegated to it the authority to
obtain equitable and legal remedies, the EEOC should have the ability to seek
these remedies, notwithstanding a binding arbitration agreement.28
Additionally, the EEOC argues that it must have the ability to seek monetary
damages so it can properly protect the public interest in eliminating workplace
discrimination.29 The EEOC concluded that equitable relief simply cannot
further its goal of protecting the public interest adequately.30
In contrast, employers typically argue that the EEOC serves the public
interest sufficiently through equitable relief.31 Supporting this argument,
employers are able to point to the federal policy favoring enforcement of
arbitration agreements, thus requiring the Court to “rigorously enforce
agreements to arbitrate.”32 Employers have also argued that by allowing the
EEOC to pursue damages on an individual’s behalf, arbitration agreements will
become almost completely ineffective.33 Clearly, there are competing interests
regarding the goals of the EEOC and the strong federal policy of encouraging
arbitration. Thus, the question remains, what effect does a binding arbitration
agreement have on the EEOC’s authority to pursue all available remedies?
25. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 806-07 (4th Cir. 1999). Courts have
allowed the EEOC to pursue injunctive relief even if an individual has previously waived or
settled a claim because injunctive relief assists the EEOC in its goal of pursuing the public
interest. Id. at 811.
26. See generally EEOC v. Kidder Peabody, & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1998). See
also Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 807.
27. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 468.
28. See generally EEOC Notice (visited Feb. 22, 2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/
mandarb.text> (describing EEOC’s policy statement on mandatory arbitration as of July 10,
1997) [hereinafter EEOC Notice]. See generally Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 461.
29. See EEOC Notice, supra note 28. The EEOC argues that the courts play a “crucial role”
in defining workplace discrimination, making it part of the public record, and deterring future
discrimination for the public. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Kidder, 156 F.3d at 302.
32. See id. (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983)).
33. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 465-66 (citing Kidder, 156 F.3d at 303). Employers
and courts have argued that by allowing the EEOC to seek monetary damages on an individual’s
behalf, the individual is able to “make an end run around the arbitration agreement by having the
EEOC pursue back pay . . . .” Id. at 466 (quoting Kidder, 156 F.3d at 303).
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This Comment will examine the effect that binding arbitration has on the
right of the EEOC to obtain a monetary remedy on the employee’s behalf. Part
II will include a historical discussion of the statutes, cases, and policies leading
to this remedies problem.34 Part III, an analysis of the opinions by three
circuits attempting to resolve this issue, demonstrates the strong disagreement
among the circuits.35 Part IV, the Critical Analysis, will discuss why it is not
logical or beneficial to allow the EEOC to pursue monetary damages after an
employee has signed a mandatory arbitration agreement. It will also discuss
why it is extremely important in the EEOC’s fight against discrimination in the
workplace that the EEOC have the ability to pursue injunctive relief.36 Part V
will conclude this Comment by forecasting the success of this solution.
Additionally, this section will offer ideas for successful implementation of this
solution.37
II. HISTORY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND THE EEOC’S ENFORCEMENT
OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES
The problem regarding what relief the EEOC may recover on behalf of an
individual who has signed a binding arbitration agreement has arisen
recently.38 Precedence has played a substantial role in bringing this specific
issue to the courts. A discussion regarding the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA),39 the statutes delegating authority to the EEOC,40 and courts’
interpretations of these statutes, provides a historical background as to the
evolution of this problem.
A.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Birth of the EEOC

Following the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC began
operating as the primary enforcement agency to stop employment
discrimination.41 When Congress enacted The Civil Rights Act, the EEOC’s

34. See infra notes 38-205 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 206-68 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 269-322 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 323-30 and accompanying text.
38. See Kidder, 156 F.3d at 300-01. This was the first appellate decision to reach this issue.
It was delivered by the Second Circuit on August 28, 1998. Id.
39. See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994 & Supp. 1997); Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42
U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §
621 (1994). These are the statutes that will be discussed throughout this Comment. They are
enforced by the EEOC, although there are other statutes delegating authority to the EEOC as well.
41. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: An Overview (visited Feb. 29,
2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/Overview.html>.
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authority was restricted compared to the authority that it has today.42 At that
time, Congress authorized the EEOC “to investigate charges of employment
discrimination and to pursue informal methods of conciliation in efforts to
resolve those charges.”43 The EEOC’s involvement ended after using informal
methods to resolve workplace discrimination.44 Consequently, if the EEOC
did not correct discrimination by informal methods,45 the individual
complaining of discrimination was responsible for bringing his or her claim to
court.46 In this way, The Civil Rights Act of 1964, in its original form, left
formal enforcement of anti-discrimination statutes largely to the discretion of
individual employees.47
In 1972, Congress recognized that the authority granted to the EEOC was
inadequate to fight discrimination.48 In General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, the
Supreme Court noted: “[T]he most striking deficiency of the 1964 Act is that
the EEOC does not have the authority to issue judicially enforceable orders to
back up its findings of discrimination . . . [this] burden of obtaining
enforceable relief rests upon each individual victim of discrimination. . . .”49
Congress noted that this was a burdensome, expensive, and time-consuming
process for individuals.50 Therefore, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
amended to allow the EEOC to bring employment discrimination claims in
federal court after informal attempts at conciliation had failed.51 However,
these amendments only authorized the EEOC to sue for specific relief, such as
reinstatement or back pay.52 Consequently, the remedies and actions available
to the EEOC were still quite limited. Additionally, the amendments allowed
aggrieved employees to retain the right to bring their own claims. Still, the
EEOC enjoyed a 180-day period of exclusive jurisdiction.53 After the 1972

42. See generally EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 455-59 (6th Cir.
1999). Here, the court demonstrates the evolution of the EEOC since 1964, when it was first
promulgated by statute. Id.
43. Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 456 (citing The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88352, § 706(a), 78 Stat. 259 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994 & Supp. III
1997)).
44. § 706(a), 78 Stat. at 259.
45. The EEOC was statutorily delegated to use informal methods of persuasion. EEOC v.
Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68 (1984).
46. Id.
47. § 706(a), 78 Stat. at 259. See also Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 457.
48. See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980). The purpose of the 1972
amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 “was to secure more effective enforcement of Title
VII.” Id.
49. Id. at 326 n.7.
50. Id.
51. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
52. See id.
53. See id.
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amendments, the EEOC was able to bring actions in federal court, instead of
simply trying to work with employers and employees on an informal basis. In
addition, public court proceedings played a great role in stopping present
discrimination and in deterring future discrimination.54
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 allowed for more expansive remedies, such
as punitive damages in situations involving intentional discrimination.55 These
amendments also endorsed the use of alternative dispute resolution methods,
including arbitration, to resolve claims arising under anti-discrimination
statutes “where appropriate and to the extent authorized by the law.”56 This
legislation demonstrated Congressional recognition that arbitration should be
used in at least some employment discrimination claims. Passage of The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 demonstrated awareness that not all employment
discrimination claims must be heard in federal court in order to obtain a valid
and just result.
B.

The Federal Arbitration Act

In order to analyze arbitration concerning the EEOC, it is necessary to look
at the historical framework of the Federal Arbitration Act. Congressional
recognition of arbitration began much earlier than the EEOC’s.57 Neither the
public nor the courts accepted arbitration in the employment discrimination
context until long after the first federal laws relating to arbitration were
promulgated.58 Federal acceptance and approval of arbitration had its
54. See generally EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 456-57 (6th Cir.
1999).
55. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
56. § 118, 105 Stat. at 1081. It is important to note that this bill to amend the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 was signed by President Bush only a few months after the decision in Gilmer was
delivered by the Court. The amendments demonstrate an attempt by Congress to allocate greater
control over workplace discrimination to the EEOC. Karen Halverson, Arbitration and The Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 445, 446-48 (1999).
It has also been argued that Section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted to
give employers less of an opportunity to use arbitration agreements and to effectively overrule the
holding in Gilmer. See id. In 1998, in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co., the Ninth Circuit
decided that §118 meant that any mandatory arbitration agreement, very similar to that in Gilmer,
should not be upheld because it is compulsory upon accepting employment. 114 F.3d 1182 (9th
Cir. 1998). So far, it does not appear that other circuits have followed this line of reasoning. See
generally Robert S. McArthur, Arbitrary Civil Rights? The Case of Duffield v. Robertson
Stephens, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 881 (1999). See generally Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., 146 F.3d
175 (3d Cir. 1998). The Seus decision demonstrates a strong disagreement with the Duffield
court on the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and its arbitration policy. Id. at 183.
57. See Wilko v. Swan, 367 U.S. 427, 429 (1953) (discussing the history of the Federal
Arbitration Act).
58. See id. at 430. This was the first Supreme Court decision regarding arbitration in an
employment context. In Wilko, the Court determined that an agreement to arbitrate could not
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beginnings in 1925, when Congress approved the United States Arbitration
Act.59
When Congress originally enacted this statute, it expressed a policy
favoring arbitration in the business community.60 In 1947, Congress reenacted
the law, naming it the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).61 Courts have
acknowledged that Congress enacted the FAA “to reverse the longstanding
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common
law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration
agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”62 Courts have since
held that the FAA demonstrates a Congressional policy favoring arbitration.63
Should the EEOC’s right to bring a claim for all remedies be hindered when
arbitration agreements are upheld in an employment discrimination context?
The evolution of the cases and public perception concerning employment
discrimination are discussed in the sections that follow.
C. The EEOC and Arbitration: Two Competing Interests Collide
In 1974, the authority granted to the EEOC collided with a strong policy
favoring arbitration in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co.,64 a case involving a
mandatory arbitration agreement in the collective bargaining context.65
Alexander, a discharged African-American worker wanted to file a lawsuit
under Title VII66 for wrongful termination and discriminatory practices.67
However, Alexander was a union member, and, therefore, was covered under
the union’s collective bargaining agreement.68 This agreement mandated
arbitration in all disputes arising from employment.69 After arbitrating in

preclude an employee from going to court based on the same claim. Id. at 438. See also
Halverson, supra note 56, at 453.
59. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
60. See generally Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983). See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane, Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 39 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Stevens discusses the fact that when the FAA was enacted, it
was for the purpose of giving merchants a right to arbitrate damages if they wanted to do so. Id.
61. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14.
62. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219
(1985)).
63. See generally Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). See
also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24.
64. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
65. See id. at 39.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). In order to bring an action under Title
VII, the claimant must first obtain a “right to sue letter” from the EEOC. Id.
67. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 39.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 39-42. The collective bargaining agreement stated that disputes had to be
submitted to a “multistep grievance procedure” which culminated at compulsory arbitration. Id.
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accordance with the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator found that
Alexander was discharged for proper reasons.70 The EEOC subsequently
dismissed Alexander’s claim.71 Alexander then filed a Title VII action in
federal court.72
The issue presented to the Court was whether Alexander had a right to
bring his claim under Title VII, despite the mandatory arbitration clause
contained in the collective bargaining agreement.73 In Alexander, the Court
held that an employee could bring the Title VII claim although he was a union
member.74 Justice Powell’s majority opinion distinguished employee claims
involving employment contracts from those claims involving an individual’s
statutory rights.75 Justice Powell reasoned that an individual’s statutory rights,
such as those granted under Title VII, could not be relinquished through a
collective bargaining agreement to arbitrate.76 Furthermore, the majority found
that the agreement in Alexander did not clearly state that the arbitration clause
would cover statutory claims in addition to covering contractual issues.77 The
Alexander majority also expressed a general skepticism regarding the
arbitration process. Justice Powell’s majority opinion demonstrated distrust in
arbitrators, stating that arbitrators may not be qualified to handle situations
involving statutory rights, like those promulgated under Title VII.78 The
majority also noted deficiencies in fact-finding in arbitration.79 For these
reasons, the majority concluded that Alexander’s claim under Title VII could
be pursued in federal court, notwithstanding the collective bargaining

70. Id. at 42.
71. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 42. In his decision, the arbitrator failed to mention any of the
employee’s claims of racial discrimination regarding his discharge, stating only that the employee
had been “discharged for just cause.” Id. at 42-43.
72. Id. at 43.
73. See id. Gardner-Denver argued that the arbitration was a sufficient remedy, and moved
to dismiss the lawsuit. See id.
74. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60. The Court stated that the EEOC’s important interest in
stopping discrimination indicated that the federal courts should be allowed to determine Title VII
claims and that “deferral to arbitral decisions would be inconsistent . . . .” Id. at 56.
75. See id. at 51-52. The Court stated that because the employee wanted to bring his claim
under Title VII, this was a statutory or individual claim that had not been clearly covered by the
collective bargaining agreement. See id.
76. Id. at 52. It was not clear at this time whether the distinction between statutory and
contract claims would also be applied if an individual entered into a binding arbitration contract,
without the presence of a collective bargaining agreement. See generally Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 34 (1991).
77. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47 n.6 (“[W]e hold that the federal policy favoring arbitration
does not establish that an arbitrator’s resolution of a contractual claim is dispositive of a statutory
claim under Title VII.”).
78. See id. at 57 (“[T]he specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law
of the shop, not the law of the land.”).
79. Id. at 57.
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agreement mandating arbitration.80 For many years, the Alexander holding
was cited for the proposition that no arbitration agreement could prevent an
employee from bringing a discrimination claim in federal court.81
In the early 1980s, the Supreme Court upheld and expanded the Alexander
decision, allowing employees to bring statutory claims against their employers
despite having a valid arbitration agreement in place.82 In Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Systems Inc., the Court allowed employees to bring an
action in federal court alleging that their employer had violated the Fair Labor
Standards Act despite finding that employees were covered by a binding
arbitration agreement.83 As in Alexander, employees were able to bring
statutory claims, even when they had previously arbitrated the claims
unsuccessfully.84 The Court stood by its rationale in Alexander, stating that
statutory claims would not be foreclosed by participation in an arbitration
agreement even when the agreement called for arbitration as the exclusive
remedy.85
In 1984, the Court decided McDonald v. City of West Branch, which also
allowed employees to bring statutory claims notwithstanding a collective
bargaining agreement. 86 As in Alexander, the Court in McDonald continued
to question the qualifications and expertise of arbitrators in arbitrating
individual statutory rights.87 This evidenced the Court’s hesitancy to allow
arbitration as a final option for employees.
An examination of Supreme Court decisions beginning in 1985
demonstrate that the judicial attitude toward arbitration agreements in
employment began to shift significantly to a policy favoring arbitration.88 In
Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,89 the Court enforced an

80. Id. at 59-60.
81. See McArthur, supra note 56, at 888-89 (citing Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 194 (D. Mass. 1998)).
82. See generally Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981). See
also McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
83. 450 U.S. at 728-31.
84. See id. at 734. After employees submitted a claim to arbitration through the collective
bargaining agreement and received an adverse result, the Court allowed the claim to be heard in
federal court. Id.
85. Id. at 745-46.
86. See McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292. The Court stated that the full faith and credit did not
require the courts to give a preclusive effect to arbitration awards when an employee claimed that
his statutory rights had been violated. See id.
87. See id. at 290. The Court stated that an arbitrator does not have the expertise required to
solve the “complex legal questions” that may arise in statutory actions. See id.
88. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) See
also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985). See
generally Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985).
89. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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arbitration agreement for antitrust claims brought under the Sherman Act.90
Citing Alexander, Soler argued that because there was a statutory claim at issue
and because that claim was not specified in the agreement to arbitrate, Soler
should not be compelled to arbitrate the dispute.91 The Court disagreed with
Soler’s argument, holding that there was a federal policy favoring arbitration,
which required the Court to “rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.”92
The Court additionally held that there was no legislative history preventing a
party from including or excluding statutory claims in an arbitration
agreement.93
In Mitsubishi, the Court also stated it was no longer suspicious or skeptical
of the arbitration process.94 This suggested that the courts might generally
uphold arbitration agreements involving statutory employment claims. The
Court stated that by entering an agreement to arbitrate, a party has not
foreclosed any rights delegated by federal statute.95 The Court held, instead,
the party has merely agreed to settle the dispute in an alternative forum.96 In
Mitsubishi, the Court concluded that it would uphold arbitration agreements
unless there was a clear intent that Congress favored a waiver of judicial
remedies for a particular statute.97 Thus, the Court demonstrated a newlyfound willingness to enforce arbitration agreements for statutory claims. With
the Mitsubishi decision, exceptions to what would be considered arbitrable in
an employment context started to dwindle.98

90. Id. at 619-20.
91. Id. at 626. The arbitration agreement, as provided in Paragraph IV of the sales
agreement states, “All disputes, controversies or differences which may arise between
[Mitsubishi] and [Soler] out of or in relation to [other articles of employment contract] . . . shall
be finally settled by arbitration. . . .” Id. at 617.
92. Id. at 626 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 221).
93. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. Compare this to the holding in Alexander, where the Court
seemed to infer that arbitration agreements would only be enforced for statutory claims if
statutory claims were explicitly mentioned in the arbitration agreement.
94. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27. Additionally, the Mitsubishi Court stated that it was
past the time when judicial suspicion of arbitration and the competence of arbitrators should
inhibit court enforcement of agreements. Id.
95. See id. at 628.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 650.
98. There were two other Supreme Court decisions that upheld enforcement of arbitration
agreements in a statutory context. See generally Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987). See also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989). Rodriguez de Quijas expressly overruled the Supreme Court’s decision in
Wilko v. Swan. Id. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
These described cases have become known as “The Mitsubishi Trilogy.” See Justin M.
Dean, Going, Going, Almost Gone: The Loss of Employees’ Rights to Bring Statutory
Discrimination Claims in Court. 63 MO. L. REV. 801, 810 (1998) (“The Mitsubishi Trilogy
provided a new foundation for the Supreme Court’s evolving view on the role of arbitration in the

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1166

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:1155

There are several reasons for this shift in attitude. In Mitsubishi, the Court
reasoned that arbitration agreements could either include or exclude statutory
claims.99 Thus, if employers wanted to include statutory claims and the
legislative history did not indicate an intent to exclude such claims, the Court
would enforce the arbitration agreement.100 The Court looked to the legislative
history and reasoned that if Congress did not intend specific claims to be
arbitrated, the statute would so provide.101 A new-found trust and acceptance
of arbitrators also accounts for the Court’s acceptance of arbitration of
statutory claims.102 Additionally, a change in the composition of the Court that
decided Alexander set the stage for the changing views regarding arbitration.103
Although the Court’s acceptance of arbitration was quite significant in
Mitsubishi, the decision did not overrule Alexander. Unlike Alexander, the
issues in Mitsubishi did not involve a collective bargaining context. This
difference also seemed to factor into the Court’s decision.104 Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. demonstrates the profound impact on the
individual employee’s ability to bring employment discrimination claims to
court when that employee signs an arbitration agreement.105
D. Arbitration and the EEOC’s Anti-Discrimination Laws Collide in Gilmer
1.

Setting the Stage for Gilmer

The Mitsubishi decision made clear the Court’s willingness to enforce
arbitration agreements when statutory claims were involved.106
Simultaneously, the Court was reacting to the EEOC’s significant increase of
authority granted by the 1972 amendments to The Civil Rights Act of 1964.107
In General Telephone Co. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court carefully examined the
1972 amendments to the Civil Rights Act, holding that the EEOC had a right to
employment context. These cases established that statutory claims were arbitrable. The next step
was to allow arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims.”).
99. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627.
100. See Rosenburg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 995 F. Supp. 190, 195-96
(D. Mass. 1998) (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27).
101. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626.
102. See id.
103. See Robert L. Duston, Gilmer v. Interstate/ Johnson Corp.: A Major Step Forward for
Alternative Dispute Resolution, or a Meaningless Decision? 7 LAB. LAW. 823, 832 (1991).
Duston comments on how these decisions gave the Rehnquist Court the opportunity to reexamine
Alexander. Id.
104. See generally McArthur, supra note 56, at 889 (discussing the Court’s maintenance of
precedence in Alexander).
105. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
106. See supra notes 88-103 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text. The 1972 amendments delegated the
EEOC significantly more authority, allowing it to pursue claims in its own name.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

THE BATTLE OVER MANDATORY ARBITRATION

1167

sue independent of any individual employee’s rights.108 This meant that the
EEOC could sue on its own behalf, and did not have to sue on behalf of the
individual employee, nor could an individual employee stop the EEOC from
pursuing the claim.109
Additionally, in Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC, the Court
interpreted the 1972 amendments to confer exclusive jurisdiction on the EEOC
over an employment discrimination claim for 180 days.110 The EEOC
demonstrated broad authority to police workplace discrimination when courts
began to interpret Title VII to mean that an individual could not withdraw a
charge from the EEOC without the EEOC’s permission.111 Additionally,
several courts have observed that an individual may not “agree to deny to the
EEOC the information it needs to advance . . . public interest. A waiver of the
right to file a charge is void as against public policy.”112 Courts have also
interpreted the 1972 amendments to state that the EEOC has complete
authority to decide what cases to bring in federal court.113
Clearly, the decisions reached in the seventeen years between Alexander
and Gilmer illustrate a considerable change in judicial attitude, giving the
EEOC greater power to stop discrimination for the public interest, and for the
interest of individual employees.114 At the same time, courts no longer
demonstrated a judicial suspicion regarding competency of arbitrators and their
ability to resolve statutory claims.115 However, the Supreme Court still had not
determined whether individual employment agreements mandating arbitration
would be consistently enforced. Congress had recently delegated additional
authority to the EEOC in the battle against workplace discrimination, and
following the 1972 amendments, and the courts also expanded the EEOC’s
authority.116 In the context of collective bargaining, it seemed well settled that
statutory claims, such as those authorizing the EEOC to act, could be heard in
federal court.117

108. See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 466 U.S. 318, 329 (1980). In General Telephone, the
Court held that, because of the broad power of the 1972 amendments to The Civil Rights Act, the
EEOC could seek class-wide relief without being certified. Id. at 320.
109. See id. at 331.
110. 432 U.S. 355, 366 (1977).
111. See EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace, 813 F.2d 1539, 1544 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1601.10 (1991)).
112. EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1987). See generally Goodyear
Aerospace, 813 F.2d at 1542-43.
113. EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1363 (6th Cir. 1975).
114. See supra notes 82-105 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. The Mitsubishi decision recognizes that
there is no longer any reason to be skeptical of arbitration agreements.
116. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
117. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974).
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Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.: The Court’s Expanding
View in Mitsubishi Extends to Employment Discrimination Claims

In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., an employee working as a
manager in a financial service corporation was required to sign a mandatory
binding arbitration agreement as a condition of his employment.118 This
agreement stated that he would resolve any work-related controversy through
arbitration.119 At age sixty-two, Gilmer’s employment was terminated and he
wanted to bring a claim stating that his employer had violated the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).120 When Gilmer filed his
complaint with the EEOC, his employer filed a motion to compel arbitration.121
For the first time, the Supreme Court decided whether a claim brought by the
EEOC under the ADEA could be subjected to a compulsory arbitration
agreement signed by an individual employee.122
In a 7-2 decision, Justice White’s majority opinion held that Gilmer’s
discrimination claim was subject to compulsory arbitration.123 The majority
further noted that Gilmer was still free to file charges with the EEOC despite
signing this agreement.124 Justice White was not persuaded by Gilmer’s
argument that the role of the EEOC to protect the public would be undermined
by arbitration.125 The majority reasoned that the EEOC had a mission of
furthering public and social policies, as well as individual rights.126 The EEOC
could, therefore, still pursue its goal in protecting the public interest even if
individuals who signed mandatory arbitration agreements were forced to
arbitrate accordingly.127 The majority concluded that nothing in statutes or

118. 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). Gilmer’s employment required that he register with several
stock exchanges. His registration for the New York Stock Exchange contained a provision which
stated that any controversy arising out of employment must be submitted to arbitration. Id.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994). See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23-24.
120. See id.
121. Id. The employer relied on an arbitration agreement in the registration application, and,
additionally, on the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 24 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)).
122. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 28.
125. Id. The court stated that it found the employee’s argument that enforcing arbitration
would undermine the purpose of the EEOC very unpersuasive. The individual would still have
the ability to file charges with the EEOC, even though the private action now had to be settled
through arbitration. The EEOC’s authority remains regardless of any arbitration agreement. Id.
126. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27.
127. Id. at 28. Here, Justice White relied on Mitsubishi, holding that, “[S]o long as the
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.” Id. (quoting
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
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legislative history demonstrated that Congress intended to preclude arbitration
as a remedy in ADEA cases.128
Gilmer argued that the Court’s decision in Alexander precluded arbitration
of employment discrimination claims.129 The majority explained that Gilmer’s
reliance on Alexander and the decisions that followed its reasoning was
unfounded for two reasons.130 First, it distinguished Gilmer from Alexander
because Alexander involved a collective bargaining agreement.131 In Gilmer,
the employee signed an individual agreement with the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) to arbitrate all claims arising out of his employment.132 The
Court stated that, unlike the claim in Alexander, Gilmer’s individual statutory
claim had not been undermined by a collective bargaining agreement.133 The
Gilmer majority further stated that statutory rights are individual rights that
may be undermined by a group interest in a collective bargaining agreement.134
This reasoning implies there is no such concern in individual agreements.135
The Gilmer majority further distinguished the case from Alexander, stating that
Gilmer had signed a clear agreement to arbitrate all claims.136 The Gilmer
Court interpreted Gilmer’s agreement to include both statutory and contractual
claims;137 whereas in Alexander, the Court held that the collective bargaining
agreement at issue clearly called for arbitration of only contractual claims.138
Finally, the Court reiterated its endorsement of arbitration as a satisfactory
process under which an employee can bring an ADEA claim.139 Looking to its
opinion in Mitsubishi, the majority emphasized the capability of arbitrators to

128. Id. at 28-29. (“[T]he mere involvement of an administrative agency in the enforcement
of a statute is not sufficient to preclude arbitration.”)
129. Id. at 33. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974).
130. See generally Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34-35.
131. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 39.
132. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
133. Id. at 34. The Court distinguished an employee’s contractual rights from his statutory
rights. The Court stated that statutory rights are individual rights that may be undermined by a
collective bargaining agreement because it is for the benefit of the entire group, instead of
individuals. Contractual rights in a collective bargaining agreement can be pursued through
arbitration because they will look out for the best possible interest of the contracting group, which
is also acceptable for individuals. See id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 34. The Gilmer majority reasoned, “[T]he interests of the individual employee
may be subordinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit.” See id.
(citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19).
136. See id. at 35.
137. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
138. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1974).
139. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson American Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 481 (1987)). Several rules ensure that arbitrators are acting prudently, and not
fraudulently. See id. at 30.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1170

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:1155

arbitrate statutory claims.140 The Court noted that Mitsubishi clearly
established arbitration as a fair process.141 Additionally, the majority pointed
out that the NYSE had promulgated several rules to ensure fairness in
arbitration.142 Thus, the Court held that there was no valid reason for Gilmer
to forego arbitration.143
What did the Gilmer decision mean to the future of arbitration agreements
in an employment discrimination context? Courts have generally interpreted
Gilmer to mean that mandatory arbitration agreements must be enforced, not
only in cases involving ADEA claims, but also in cases involving the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII.144 However, several postGilmer decisions continue to raise issues regarding the adequacy of specific
employment arbitration agreements.145

140. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-31 (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 624). See also Moses H. Cone
Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Mitsubishi Motor Corp., v. Soler
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985).
141. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-31. The Gilmer decision discusses preceding cases, which state
that arbitration is a fair and just forum for employment discrimination; FAA provisions that
protect against biased arbitrators; and NYSE rules set out to make arbitration a fair process in the
securities industry. Id. at 30 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
142. Id. at 31-32. The Gilmer majority recognizes several NYSE rules that were enacted to
make the arbitration process fair in the securities industry, stating that “The NYSE rules,
however, do require that all arbitration awards be in writing, and that the awards contain the
names of the parties, a summary of the issues in controversy, and a description of the award
issued.” Id. The Gilmer majority also recognizes several N.Y.S.E. provisions designed to make
the discovery process adequate for the arbitration proceedings. See id. at 31.
143. Id. at 35.
144. See supra note 56 and accompanying text. But cf. Duffield v. Robertson, Stephens &
Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit decision in Duffield is the exception to this
general rule that arbitration agreements must be enforced regarding employment discrimination
claims. Id. at 1194-96.
See 42 U.S.C. §12101 (1994); 42 U.S.C. 2000e(5) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). See
generally Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Containers, Inc., 78 F.3d 875, 880-82 (6th Cir.
1999); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Hooters of Am., Inc. v.
Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999).
145. For example, in Cole v. Burns International Security Services, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that an employer could not require an employee to arbitrate every
dispute arising from employment, without some mechanism for meaningful judicial review.
Additionally, the Court held that an employer could not require an employee to pay all or part of
fees involved in arbitration. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1468-69.
Additionally, in DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., the court held that attorney’s fees
could not be denied in disregard of Title VII, because the employee had arbitrated instead of
using the judicial process. 983 F. Supp 459, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Recently, in Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, the Fourth Circuit recognized that predispute agreements to arbitrate would be enforced. However, the court held that when the
agreement is illusory, or has no consideration, it is unenforceable, just like any other contract.
173 F.3d at 940.
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The Aftermath: Reactions to Gilmer

The Gilmer decision prompted reactions from various special interest
groups. These reactions are important to identifying remedies available to the
EEOC because each group demonstrated and hypothesized the effects that
mandatory arbitration would have on the EEOC’s ability to stop
discrimination. Some suggest that one way to alleviate these effects is to allow
the EEOC to pursue all remedies, without regard to an agreement mandating
arbitration.146 However, others have argued that this would only make the
situation more complicated because arbitration agreements are helpful, in some
way, to employers, employees, and the EEOC.147 These reactions also
demonstrate the effects of mandatory arbitration on the public interest.
1.

The EEOC’s View

Understandably, the EEOC has expressed a strong opinion about the
enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements.148 In a 1997 Policy
Statement, the EEOC expressed a strong disapproval of binding mandatory
arbitration agreements.149 The Policy Statement was issued during a time
when a growing number of employers required applicants to sign arbitration
agreements as a condition of employment.150 The EEOC explained its belief
that Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to make enforcement of
anti-discrimination laws in the workplace a top priority.151 The Policy
Statement asserted that the federal government has primary responsibility for
enforcement of employment discrimination laws for the private interest and the
public interest.152 The Policy Statement also opined that courts are responsible
to develop and interpret laws governing the EEOC and employment
discrimination.153
It is important to observe that many of the EEOC’s arguments in its 1997
Policy Statement focus on the EEOC’s role in protecting the public interest,
rather than its role in protecting individual employees from discriminatory

146. See infra notes 148-62 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 173-84 and accompanying text.
148. See generally EEOC Notice, supra note 28.
149. Id. The 1997 Policy Statement states that “agreements that mandate binding arbitration
of discrimination claims as a condition of employment are contrary to the fundamental principles
evinced in [U.S. employment discrimination] laws.” Id.
150. See id.
151. See id. (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)); H.R. REP. NO.
88-914, pt. 2 (1963) (separate views of Rep. McCullough et al.)).
152. See EEOC Notice, supra note 28. The 1997 Policy Statement states that statutory
considerations should be the concern of the court, and that because the EEOC is set forth by
statute, the federal courts should have the ultimate responsibility in constructing the meaning of
its duties. Id.
153. Id.
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behavior.154 The Policy Statement reasons that because courts contain public
records, and are a significant part of public life, judicial decisions are
necessary for the EEOC’s enforcement scheme because they promote nondiscriminatory behavior in two ways. First, the public nature of litigation
ensures that the public will observe awards meant to punish a discriminating
employer.155 In this way, judicial decision-making forces employers to be
accountable to the public for their actions.156 Second, employers will observe
the legal consequences of workplace discrimination.157 In this way, litigation
helps deter future discrimination by other employers and protects the public
interest.158 The EEOC claims that mandatory arbitration does not fulfill either
of these goals because the very nature of arbitration is private instead of
public.159
Additionally, the EEOC argues that arbitration awards cannot be
overturned by the same mechanism used by courts in overturning decisions.160
According to the EEOC, arbitration does not create precedent, nor does it
expand and reinterpret law, like a court decision.161 In this way, the EEOC
argues that arbitration does not effectively serve the public interest.162
154. Id.
155. Id. The EEOC Policy Statement discusses the nature of the judicial process and litigation
by stating:
Through its public nature [the judicial process as opposed to arbitration proceedings]—
manifested through published decisions— the exercise of judicial authority is subject to
public scrutiny and system-wide checks and balances. . .[w]hen courts fail to interpret or
apply the anti-discrimination laws in accord with the values underlying them, they are
subject to correction by higher level courts and by Congress.
Id.
156. Id.
157. See EEOC Notice, supra note 28. The EEOC policy statement explains that it has been
proven many times that the “risks of negative publicity and blemished business reputation can be
powerful influences on behavior.” Id.
158. See id.
159. Id. The EEOC policy statement notes that arbitral decisions are not published and,
therefore, do not assist in stopping discriminatory behavior the same way that published court
opinions do. Id.
160. See id.
161. Id.
162. EEOC Notice, supra note 28. In its latest policy statement on the matter, the EEOC fails
to discuss the limited judicial review of arbitration awards. The Court may overrule an arbitrator’s
decision when there is evidence of fraud or corruption by the arbitrators, or by a demonstration
that the arbitrator has a bias against one of the parties. See generally 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994 &
Supp. IV. 1998). This section of the Federal Arbitration Act states:
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for the district wherein the
[arbitration] award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the application
of any party to the arbitration—(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
undue means. (2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them. (3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
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The National Academy of Arbitrators’ View

The National Academy of Arbitrators (the Academy) is another group that
has taken notice of the Gilmer holding. In 1997, the Academy issued a
statement opposing the use of mandatory arbitration in employment
discrimination claims.163 However, the Academy stated that as long as the
Gilmer standard governing mandatory arbitration agreements in individual
employment is still the law, it will continue to arbitrate employment
discrimination disputes pursuant to such agreements.164
3.

The Commission on the Future of Worker Management Relations’
View

In a 1994 report, the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Relations (the Commission) also spoke out on mandatory arbitration
agreements, stating that binding arbitration agreements should not be
enforceable.165 The Commission stated that there should be several routes that
an employee may take when he or she has a discrimination complaint.166 The
Commission further recognized that the use of mandatory arbitration
agreements is likely to continue, and that due process guarantees must be
protected.167 Consequently, the Commission listed goals for employers in
creating an arbitration system to be used relating to employment discrimination
claims.168 The Commission stated that in order to provide sufficient due
process, arbitration agreements needed to allow for remedies equal to those
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced. (4) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the
agreement required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion,
direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
Id.
163. See National Academy of Arbitrators, Statement of the National Academy of Arbitrators
On Individual Contracts Of Employment and Guidelines on Arbitration of Statutory Claims
Under Employer- Promulgated Systems (last visited Mar. 19, 2000) <http://www.naarb.org/guide
lines.html> [hereinafter, National Academy of Arbitrators]. (“The National Academy of
Arbitrators opposes mandatory employment arbitration as a condition of employment when it
requires waiver of direct access to either a judicial or administrative forum for the pursuit of
statutory rights.”) See also FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 220-21.
164. See generally National Academy of Arbitrators, supra note 163.
165. See generally Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, U.S. Dep’ts
of Commerce and Labor, Commission on Future of Worker-Management Relations, Report and
Recommendations (Dec. 1994) [hereinafter Dunlop Report]. The Commission was headed by
John Dunlop, former Secretary of Labor.
166. See id. at 28.
167. See id. at 31. Among the guarantees suggested were: a jointly selected neutral arbitrator,
adequate discovery, cost-sharing, and a written opinion of the award granted. See Dunlop Report,
supra note 165, at 31.
168. See id.
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available through the judicial process.169 It also stated that the arbitration
process should allow for a neutral arbitrator who, “knows the laws in question
and understands the concerns of the parties.”170 Furthermore, the Commission
recognized that because of the EEOC’s severe backlog, it is necessary to have
alternatives to the judicial process, otherwise, not all claims would be resolved
adequately.171 Clearly, the Commission recognized that arbitration agreements
in employment discrimination serve a useful purpose.172
4.

Other Important Policy Views

Several important policy arguments also support mandatory arbitration for
employment discrimination claims. One benefit of mandatory arbitration is
that it ensures that all claims of discrimination are addressed in some
manner.173 In 1997, the EEOC received over 80,000 charges of discrimination,
and its backlog has soared in the past few years.174 Also in 1997, only slightly
over 11,000 of these cases were resolved on the merits through the judicial
process.175
In an attempt to alleviate this problem, the EEOC started classifying cases
according to importance. 176 This means that many valid discrimination claims
may not receive resolution for several years.177 Some even suggest that the
EEOC should not handle individual charges and, instead, “use the limited
resources for routing out systemic unlawful practices.”178 Additionally,
proponents of arbitration for use in employment discrimination claims argue
that the judicial process is too costly for many individual employees, and for
smaller employers.179 Arbitration is a less costly way to resolve complaints of
discrimination.180
169. See FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 240-42 (citing Dunlop Report, supra note 165).
170. See Dunlop Report, supra note 165, at 31.
171. See id. at 25.
172. Id. In the report, the Commission recognized that there was value to arbitration in
employment, stating that arbitration was more cost efficient and time efficient for employers than
the judicial process in many situations. Additionally, the Commission recognized that arbitration
is useful for an employee who wants to bring a claim, yet, wants the chance to remain in his/her
current position. See id. at 25-26.
173. See FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 245.
174. See The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, All Statutes (last visited Jan.
10, 2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html>.
175. See id.; see also FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 247.
176. See Theodore St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 8.
177. See id.
178. Id. at 9. (“The situation [regarding the backlog of cases at the EEOC] is so bleak that
Professor Maurice Munroe of the Thomas M. Cooley Law School has recommended, quite
understandably, that the EEOC get out of the business of handling individual charges. . . .”)
179. Id. at 7-8. The process of arbitration, being simpler and cheaper than the judicial
process, is very practical for many individuals. Id. See also FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 224.
180. See FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 251.
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These arguments regarding the fairness and practicalities inherent in the
judicial process and arbitration help illustrate the problem of what remedies the
EEOC should be able to seek when there is a binding arbitration agreement.
The EEOC asserts that it should have the ability to collect monetary relief on
an individual’s behalf in court, because it views mandatory arbitration as being
inherently unfair.181 However, others have demonstrated valid counterarguments regarding the fairness and efficiency of arbitration.182 Additionally,
allowing the EEOC to obtain any remedy for an individual employee inhibits
the finality of the arbitrator’s decision.183 If there is no finality for the
remedies granted through arbitration, it is unlikely that employers will even
continue to set forth these agreements.184 Court decisions, coupled with these
policy arguments, demonstrate the impact that binding arbitration has on the
EEOC’s request for remedies and why it has become an important problem
that must be solved.
F.

What Does Gilmer Mean for the EEOC’s Broad Right to Seek Remedies?

Policy decisions favoring and disfavoring arbitration contribute to the
problem surrounding the EEOC’s ability to gain monetary relief when there is
a binding arbitration agreement.185 One must also examine cases following
Gilmer, relating to the EEOC and its right to seek certain damages, in order to
gain insight as to what remedies should be available. Lower courts have issued
many decisions discussing when the EEOC has the ability to bring a claim
after an individual has previously litigated a dispute.186 These decisions give
insight to what should occur when an individual enters a binding arbitration
agreement, regarding the EEOC’s right to remedies.
Several circuits have stated that the EEOC is not completely barred from
bringing a claim, even after an individual has previously litigated the same
employment discrimination claim.187 The rationale for this is that the EEOC

181. See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text.
182. See supra, notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
183. See generally St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 8.
184. See id.
185. See supra notes 148-80 and accompanying text.
186. See infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
187. See New Orleans Steamship Ass’n v. EEOC, 680 F.3d 23, 26 (5th Cir. 1982). The Fifth
Circuit held that the EEOC could bring a claim for an action previously litigated by individual
parties if the EEOC’s challenge was different in some way (e.g. different investigation, different
relief being sought). Id. at 25-26.
See also EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286 (7th Cir. 1993). Here, the court
affirmed the district court opinion, stating the EEOC could not obtain individual monetary relief
when an individual had previously litigated his claim. However, the court stated that prospective
injunctive relief was still available to the EEOC because it furthered the EEOC’s goal in
eradicating discrimination for the public interest. Id. at 1291.
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brings a claim not only for a private individual’s interest, but also for the
public interest.188 However, these cases draw substantial lines as to what
remedies the EEOC may seek when a claim has been previously litigated.189
In EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., an employee pursued an ADEA claim in
federal court, receiving an adverse result.190 The EEOC then pursued a
discrimination claim relating to the same events.191 In U.S. Steel, the Third
Circuit stated that, “if a person first litigates in his own behalf, that person may
be precluded from claiming any of the benefits of a judgment in a subsequent
action that is brought or defended by a party representing him.”192 The court
held that the doctrine of res judicata applies when the EEOC is representing the
interests of a private individual.193 The court also reasoned that it would not
express any view about whether res judicata applies when an individual shares

See also EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 496-97 (3d Cir. 1990). In U.S. Steel,
the court held that individuals who had fully litigated claims pursuant to the ADEA could not
obtain individual relief in actions by the EEOC. Id. at 495.
188. See Harris Chernin, 10 F.3d at 1291. The EEOC emphasized that there is a difference
between suing on behalf of the employee’s personal interest, and suing on behalf of the public
interest. The court stated that an individual could not further the public interest by his litigation
in the same way that the EEOC could further the public interest. Therefore, the court held that
the EEOC could still sue on behalf of the public interest. Id. See also U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 495.
189. See supra notes 187-88.
190. U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 491.
191. Id. Several employees filed a class action alleging that their employer had violated the
ADEA regarding the payment of a pension. Id. The EEOC also filed an action alleging unlawful
employment practices under the ADEA, regarding the same pension payments. Id. U.S. Steel
argued that some of these employees were not entitled to further retroactive relief because they
had settled their ADEA claims and were, therefore, precluded by the doctrine of res judicata from
receiving other remedies. Id. The EEOC conceded that the employees who had previously
settled their claims should not receive prejudgment interest from the EEOC action. Id. at 492.
Accordingly, the question before the Third Circuit was “whether res judicata bars the award of
individual relief for the former employees who previously litigated their ADEA claim and
suffered an adverse final judgment.” Id. at 490.
192. Id. at 493.
193. See id. at 494. The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, has been applied in this
case. In order to show that a claim should be precluded, it is necessary to demonstrate that “there
has been 1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving 2) the same claim and 3) the
same parties or their privies.” Id. at 493 (citing United States v. Athlone Ind., Inc., 746 F.2d 977,
983 (3d Cir. 1984)). The court decided that the first two elements were present because there was
a final judgment on the merits by an individual claimant, and it related to the same issues for
which the EEOC is suing. However, the parties are not in privity when the EEOC is suing for the
public interest. See U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 496.
See id. at 494-95. The court stated that it was convinced that Congress would not have
cut off the right of an individual to institute a private action once the EEOC has instituted an
action unless it believed that the EEOC could adequately represent the interest of the individual,
enforcing the individual’s rights. Id.
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in the benefits of an EEOC claim, because then, the EEOC was attempting only
to serve the public interest.194
The Seventh Circuit followed the U.S. Steel rationale and held that an
adverse judgment in an individual’s ADEA claim precluded the EEOC from
seeking monetary relief on an employee’s behalf.195 The court determined that
the EEOC was not barred from bringing a claim for equitable relief, such as an
injunction prohibiting future discrimination, because the public interest in
stopping discrimination in the workplace would be served.196 Furthermore, the
court addressed the apparent inconsistency of allowing the EEOC to pursue
one type of relief and not another.197 The court reasoned that a private
individual could not adequately represent the interest of the EEOC in
protecting the public from an employer’s discriminatory behavior.198 Only the
EEOC could pursue this interest adequately, by seeking equitable relief against
future violations.199 Consequently, the EEOC was not barred from seeking
injunctive relief by res judicata principles.200
Through the examination of statutory authority granted to the EEOC and
the case law interpreting these statutes, it is clear that the EEOC has been
delegated an increasingly substantial amount of authority to stop workplace
discrimination.201 This authority protects the public interest, and the interests
of private individuals.202 Through judicial decision-making and federal
statutes, it is also clear that the EEOC may be barred from claiming damages
for an individual if that individual has already fully litigated his claim.203

194. Id. at 496.
195. See EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1290-91 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing U.S.
Steel, 921 F.2d at 493).
196. See U.S. Steel, 921 F.2d at 496; Harris Chernin, 10 F.3d at 1291. In Harris Chernin, the
court affirmed that individual litigation barred the EEOC from seeking back pay and other
individual damages. However, it allowed the EEOC to sue for injunctive relief, as long as the
EEOC could demonstrate a violation of the ADEA against the employee. See id.
197. Id.
198. See id. The court in Harris Chernin noted the distinction made by the U.S. Steel court
between the individual protections provided by the EEOC and the public interest protections
provided by the EEOC. Then, the Harris Chernin court reached the conclusion that the EEOC
could not be barred when seeking an injunction to prevent further violations because this remedy
protects the public interest, not the interests of the private individual. Id.
199. See Harris Chernin, 10 F.3d at 1291.
200. Id. It is noteworthy that the EEOC has the ability to represent adequately all of the
interests of individual employees. See EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 301 (2d
Cir. 1998) (quoting EEOC v. Goodyear Aerospace, 813 F.2d 1539, 1543 (9th Cir. 1987)).
201. See supra notes 42-63 and accompanying text.
202. See generally EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 494-95 (3d Cir. 1990).
203. See supra notes 187-200 and accompanying text.
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No court has held that the EEOC should be bound to arbitrate when an
employee has signed a binding arbitration agreement.204 However, two recent
decisions have precluded the EEOC from obtaining the monetary remedy in
court because individuals entered a binding arbitration agreement; a third
decision disagreed, creating a split in authority. These decisions are discussed
in Part III.205
III. A CIRCUIT SPLIT DEVELOPS
A.

The Second and Fourth Circuits Views: The EEOC Cannot Seek Monetary
Relief on behalf of an Individual who has Signed a Binding Arbitration
Agreement
1.

The Second Circuit: EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody and Co.

In 1992, the EEOC claimed that Kidder, Peabody & Company (Kidder),
violated the ADEA by engaging in a pattern of terminating older employees
because of their age. The EEOC sought liquidated damages, back pay, and
reinstatement on behalf of seventeen former Kidder employees.206 As a
requirement of employment at Kidder, nine of those employees had signed
agreements mandating arbitration.207 Three of those nine employees arbitrated
their claims. The arbitrator did not award any damages and stated that Kidder
had not violated the ADEA.208 The EEOC later stipulated that it only sought
monetary damages on behalf of the nine employees who had signed arbitration
agreements.209 Kidder filed a motion to dismiss stating the EEOC should be
precluded from obtaining any monetary remedy on behalf of an employee who
had signed a binding arbitration agreement.210 Additionally, Kidder argued
that under Gilmer, the employees who signed agreements to arbitrate had
waived their right to a monetary award from the court.211 The district court
204. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 811 (4th Cir. 1999). The court
recognized that Title VII and the ADA do not imply that the EEOC must participate in
arbitration. Here, the EEOC was not even a party to the arbitration agreement, so it could not be
forced to arbitrate for any reason. Id.
205. See infra notes 206-68.
206. EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1998). See also EEOC v.
Kidder, Peabody, & Co., 979 F. Supp. 245, 245 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
207. See Kidder, 156 F.3d at 300. The arbitration agreement that the employees signed was
the same agreement signed in Gilmer. It is called the U-4 registration form and is used by the
NYSE. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 300. The EEOC changed the remedies it was seeking because Kidder discontinued
its business in investment banking, therefore, there was no need for equitable relief, such as
reinstatement. The EEOC sought liquidated damages and back pay. Id.
210. See Kidder, 156 F.3d at 300.
211. Kidder, 979 F. Supp. at 247 (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28).
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agreed with Kidder’s argument and granted its motion to dismiss the claim.212
The court held that “to allow the EEOC to recover monetary damages would
frustrate the purpose of the FAA because an employee, having signed the
agreement to arbitrate, could avoid arbitration by having the EEOC file in the
federal forum seeking back pay on his or her behalf.”213 The EEOC
appealed.214
In a case of first impression, the Second Circuit decided how a binding
arbitration agreement should impact the EEOC’s power to enforce antidiscrimination laws and seek all statutory remedies. The majority opinion held
that the EEOC could not pursue purely monetary relief on behalf of an
employee who signed a binding arbitration agreement and dismissed the
claim.215 The majority stated that the “clear implication of Gilmer is that the
EEOC may not seek monetary relief on behalf of claimants who have entered
valid arbitration agreements.”216 The majority recognized that in Gilmer,
arbitration agreements did not preclude the EEOC from investigating a charge
of discrimination, nor did these agreements prevent individuals from filing
charges with the EEOC.217 Additionally, the court looked to previous
decisions to determine that the EEOC could not seek a monetary remedy on
behalf of an employee who has settled, waived, or previously litigated his or
her discrimination claim.218 The court reasoned that this also meant that a
prior submission by an individual to an arbitration agreement precluded the
EEOC from seeking monetary relief on an employee’s behalf.219
The majority recognized that the EEOC had a valid interest in protecting
the public by stopping discrimination and in serving the needs of private
individuals.220 However, the majority reasoned that the EEOC would still have

212. See id.
213. See EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 300 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing the
district court opinion in Kidder, 979 F. Supp. at 247).
214. Id.
215. See id. at 303. In Kidder, the court stated that by allowing an individual to reap the
benefits of a suit by the EEOC through receipt of monetary damages, that individual is able to
make an “end run around the arbitration agreement . . . undermin[ing] the Gilmer decision and the
FAA.” Id.
216. Id. at 301.
217. See Kidder, 156 F.3d at 301.
218. See id. (citing Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 522 (3d Cir. 1988); Moore v.
McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d 1026, 1033 (8th Cir. 1986); Runyan v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp.,
787 F.2d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. 850 (1986)).
219. See Kidder, 156 F.3d at 301.
220. See id. at 303. The court concluded, stating, “In sum, this case presents competing
public interests— the interest in allowing the EEOC broad authority to pursue actions to eradicate
and prevent employment discrimination and the interest in encouraging parties to arbitrate.” Id.
The court further stated that monetary relief does not affect the public interest to the same degree
as injunctive relief. See id. at 301.
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the ability to serve the public interest without pursuing any monetary remedy
because it had several equitable remedies available in protecting the public
from discriminatory behavior.221 The majority explained that this decision
struck the right balance between the EEOC’s interest and the policy favoring
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.222
Finally, the court stated that its decision was a sound one because an
individual who signed an arbitration agreement should not be permitted to gain
any relief from a court action by the EEOC.223 This would allow the individual
to “make an end run around the arbitration agreement by having the EEOC
pursue back pay or liquidated damages.”224 The court implied that by allowing
this, the arbitration process would become meaningless and agreements would
be ineffective, thereby undermining Gilmer and the FAA.225
Judge Feinberg’s concurrence in Kidder is interesting because it
foreshadows the possibility of a split in opinions regarding whether the EEOC
is able to seek individual monetary relief. The concurrence raised additional
arguments regarding the EEOC’s right to obtain monetary damages.226 Judge
Feinberg started his opinion by stating that he believed the decision was
correct, given the governing case law.227 However, he went on to conclude
that he would have decided the case differently if the court had written on a
“clean slate.”228 Judge Feinberg’s opinion expressed concerns about whether
ADEA rights could be thoroughly vindicated in arbitration. He expressed
concerns as to whether monetary relief is as useful as equitable relief for the
EEOC in pursuing its goal of protecting the public from discriminatory
behavior.229 He noted that smaller monetary awards are usually received
through arbitration rather than through the court process.230 Additionally,
Judge Feinberg disagreed with the majority that allowing monetary damages
would cause individuals to make an “end run around the arbitration

221. See id.
222. See id. The court recognized that this decision does not eliminate the possibility of
monetary damages altogether. Instead, it limits the individual who has signed a binding
arbitration agreement to receive monetary damages only through the arbitration process. See id.
223. See id.
224. Kidder, 156 F.3d at 303.
225. See id. at 302-03.
226. See id. at 304 (Feinberg, J., concurring).
227. See id. Judge Feinberg stated, “I concur because I believe that the majority opinion
correctly reads the import of Gilmer. . . .” Id.
228. Id.
229. See Kidder, 156 F.3d at 304.
230. See id. Judge Feinberg stated, “I find it eminently plausible that on the risk of a single,
large award, in an EEOC case brought on behalf of multiple employees would be a greater
deterrent to illegal conduct than the risk of multiple smaller awards obtained by the employees
through arbitration . . . .” Id.
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agreement.”231 He discussed the large caseload and the limited resources of
the EEOC,232 suggesting that the EEOC simply would not have the ability to
pursue a majority of discrimination claims by individuals who entered
mandatory arbitration agreements.233 Therefore, it would be unlikely that
individuals could make an “end run around” an arbitration agreement.234 He
concluded by suggesting that a uniform solution to this problem should be
reached quickly. However, Judge Feinberg left it to Congress or the Supreme
Court to promulgate this solution, not the Second Circuit.235
2.

The Fourth Circuit: EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.

On October 6, 1999, the Fourth Circuit interpreted and followed Kidder,
stating that an employee who signed a binding arbitration agreement could not
recover monetary damages when the EEOC pursued the claim in its own
name.236 In EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., employee Eric Baker was discharged
after suffering a seizure at work.237 The separation notice stated that for “[the
employee’s] benefit and safety and [the safety of] Waffle House, it would be
best he not work here anymore.”238 After termination, Mr. Baker filed charges
with the EEOC.239 The EEOC sued under the ADA, requesting a permanent
injunction to bar Waffle House from any future discrimination based on
disability, back pay and reinstatement on behalf of the former employee,
compensation for losses, and punitive damages.240 Waffle House responded by
filing a petition to compel arbitration arguing that the employee signed a
binding arbitration agreement before he was hired.241 Waffle House contended
that the EEOC had no right to sue because it was bound by the employee’s

231. See generally Kidder, 156 F.3d at 303. Compare with Kidder, 156 F.3d at 304
(Feinberg, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the majority on the issue of whether a claim by the
EEOC would allow an employee to circumvent an arbitration agreement).
232. Id.
233. See id. at 303.
234. Id. Judge Feinberg disagrees with the majority by stating, “I do not think it is likely that
the EEOC will pursue monetary damages simply to accommodate employees seeking to avoid
arbitration. . . .” Id.
235. Id.
236. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 806-07 (4th Cir. 1999).
237. Id. at 807.
238. See id. The belief is that the employee suffered the seizure due to a change in
medication that could have been easily corrected. Id.
239. Id.
240. See id., 193 F.3d at 807-08.
241. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 808.
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arbitration agreement.242 The EEOC argued that it had never agreed to
arbitrate, and should be allowed to pursue all remedies available by statute.243
The Fourth Circuit majority held that when the EEOC pursued equitable
relief, it was protecting the public interest.244 The court allowed the EEOC to
seek equitable relief, notwithstanding a binding arbitration agreement.245 The
court, however, refused to allow the EEOC to obtain monetary damages on
behalf of Mr. Baker because of the arbitration clause.246 The majority stated
that nothing in the ADA, or any other statute delegating authority to the EEOC,
implies that the EEOC is held to an arbitration agreement when an employee
has entered this type of agreement.247 The court stated that under Gilmer, the
individual could arbitrate to receive individual remedies.248 For these reasons,
the Waffle House court determined that the EEOC could not seek a monetary
remedy on an individual’s behalf.249
A.

A New View of Binding Arbitration Agreements: The Sixth Circuit View
in EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery and Crafts

The Sixth Circuit, in EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc. repeated
many of the same arguments articulated by Judge Feinberg in Kidder to reach a
conclusion opposite to those reached by the Second and Fourth Circuits.250 In

242. See id. On appeal, Waffle House argued that the arbitration agreement between Mr.
Baker and Waffle House binds the EEOC to pursue any connected claims in arbitration. Id.
243. See id. at 809.
244. Id.
245. Id. The court stated:
Thus, we hold that to the extent that the EEOC seeks ‘a permanent injunction enjoining
[Waffle House] from discharging individuals and engaging in other employment practice
which discriminates on the basis of disability’ the EEOC is pursuing the public interest in
a discrimination-free workplace, and it must be allowed to do so in federal court, as
authorized by the ADA . . . .
See id. at 812-13.
246. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 809. In Waffle House, the court recognized that the EEOC
has never entered an agreement to arbitrate, and thus cannot be held to the employee’s arbitration
agreement. Additionally, the court recognized that in Gilmer, the Supreme Court demonstrated
that “the EEOC, acting in its public role, is not bound by private arbitration agreements.” Id. In
Waffle House, the court went on to state that this means that the EEOC can file a suit to
accomplish societal goals of protecting the public interest. See id. at 811.
However, the court then holds that the EEOC cannot “trample this strong [federal] policy
favoring arbitration” by pursuing damages on the individual’s behalf. Id. at 812.
It is noteworthy that one Judge did dissent in Waffle House. However, his dissent related
to the belief that the mandatory arbitration agreement was faulty, and, therefore, non-binding on
Mr. Baker. See id. at 813-18 (King, J., dissenting).
247. See id. at 809.
248. See id. at 807.
249. See id.
250. See EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 468 (6th Cir. 1999).
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Frank’s Nursery, the Sixth Circuit held that the EEOC was not barred from
bringing a claim requesting injunctive or monetary relief on the employee’s
behalf.251 As was stated in the Introduction, Carol Adams, an AfricanAmerican employee, signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of her
employment at Frank’s. 252 After being passed over for a new position, Adams
filed a complaint with the EEOC alleging that she had been passed over
because she was an African-American.253 After failed conciliation attempts, the
EEOC sued Frank’s in the district court requesting equitable relief, back pay,
and compensatory and punitive damages on Adams’ behalf.254 Frank’s moved
to dismiss, stating that Adams was obligated to arbitrate and to receive any
remedy through arbitration, as set forth by the agreement.255
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision dismissing all of the
EEOC’s claims regarding injunctive and monetary relief.256 The court first
discussed the EEOC’s right to pursue injunctive relief, holding that several
other courts have recognized the EEOC’s right to gain this relief after an
individual had previously litigated.257 The court reasoned that this meant the
EEOC could receive injunctive relief notwithstanding an employee’s
arbitration agreement.258 The court analyzed previous decisions to hold that
without an ability to pursue this type of relief, the EEOC could not properly
protect the public interest.259
The court also stated that there was no inconsistency between the holding
of Gilmer and allowing the EEOC to pursue monetary relief on Adams’
behalf.260 The Sixth Circuit held that res judicata principles are inapplicable to
binding arbitration agreements and the EEOC’s right to sue for monetary
damages for two reasons. First, the court stated that the EEOC cannot be
barred by res judicata principles because the EEOC and the individual

251. See id. at 453.
252. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
253. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 452-53.
254. See id. at 452. The EEOC requested an injunction to prevent future discrimination at
Frank’s, and it requested an order by the court to institute policies providing equal employment
opportunities to African-Americans, as well as damages. See id.
255. Id.
256. See id.
257. See supra note 187.
258. EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 459 (6th Cir. 1999).
259. See id. The court stated that the interest of the EEOC in protecting the public outweighs
the private promise to arbitrate. See id.
260. See id. at 461. The majority in Frank’s Nursery held that “While Gilmer stated that
‘arbitration agreements will not preclude the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class wide or
equitable relief,’ we do not read the Court’s language as excluding other kinds of relief.” Id.
(quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991)).
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employee do not share the same interests.261 Second, the court distinguished
this situation from prior cases where res judicata barred the second suit in a
discrimination claim, by explaining that all of the previous cases involved a
previously litigated or settled claim.262 In Frank’s Nursery, Adams had not
previously litigated the claim, nor did she give up her right to back pay or other
damages through settlement.263
Finally, the majority rejected the Second Circuit’s view, that by allowing
the EEOC to pursue a monetary remedy, a private individual could “make an
end run around the arbitration agreement.”264 Similar to the argument in Judge
Feinberg’s concurring opinion in Kidder, the Sixth Circuit stated that the
EEOC has the power to decide what claims it will litigate and what claims it
will not pursue.265 An individual has no way of knowing if the EEOC will
bring an action on his behalf.266 The Frank’s Nursery majority concluded by
stating that Congress would not have delegated the EEOC any authority to
obtain monetary damages if it thought that the EEOC could effectively
eliminate employment discrimination with only injunctive relief.267
The differences between litigation and arbitration make the ultimate
resolution of this issue important to the EEOC, employers, and employees.
Although the opinions vary greatly, all three opinions rely on valid judicial
decision-making, statutory evidence, and policy arguments to reach different
conclusions.268 Additionally, the opinions in all three circuits are concerned
with the EEOC’s role in protecting the public interest and the individual’s
interest. Each also expresses a desire to conform to the strong federal policy
favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements. What is the best way to
resolve this split in authority for the benefit of all involved parties?

261. See id. at 463. The EEOC serves two competing interests so it must be authorized to
“proceed in a unified action and to obtain the most satisfactory overall relief . . . .” Id. (citing
General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980)).
262. See id. (“[T]here is no question that the present case does not involve a prior suit or even
a prior arbitration that raised or resolved the issues raised in the EEOC’s complaint.”)
263. See Frank’s Nursery, 177 F.3d at 463.
264. See id. at 468 (quoting EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir.
1998)).
265. Id. at 468 (citing General Tel., 446 U.S. at 326).
266. See id.
267. Id. at 467. The majority in Frank’s Nursery believes that injunctive and monetary relief
are both necessary in the EEOC’s goal of protecting the public interest. Id.
268. See generally supra notes 206-35 and accompanying text; supra notes 236-49 and
accompanying text; supra notes 250-67 and accompanying text. These notes and text highlight
the different arguments that could be raised regarding the remedies problem.
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IV. THE EEOC’S ENFORCEMENT OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES IN THE
WORKPLACE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
By balancing the federal interest in enforcing arbitration agreements and
the EEOC’s interest in protecting individuals and the public, the best solution
to this problem is the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Waffle House.269 Here, the
Fourth Circuit allowed the EEOC to seek equitable relief on behalf of the
public interest.270 The Fourth Circuit has also adequately balanced the interest
favoring arbitration by barring the EEOC from seeking a monetary remedy
when there is a binding arbitration agreement.271 The decision in Waffle House
is logical because it allows the EEOC to enforce general anti-discrimination
principles, while demonstrating that courts should enforce binding arbitration
agreements.272 Additionally, this decision provides a result that is beneficial to
the EEOC, employers, and employees.273
In this section, Part A will explain why the EEOC must be allowed to seek
injunctive relief and how this benefits employers, employees, and the
EEOC.274 The necessity for barring the EEOC from its pursuit of monetary
relief, after an employee has signed a binding arbitration agreement, is
discussed in Part B.275
A.

The Importance of the EEOC’s Ability to Seek Injunctive Relief on Behalf
of the Public Interest, notwithstanding an Arbitration Agreement

The EEOC must have an ability to seek equitable relief for the protection
of the public interest, in order to effectively enforce anti-discrimination
laws.276 It is widely recognized that “the EEOC cannot be viewed as merely an
institutional surrogate for individual victims of discrimination.”277 The EEOC
must also protect the public interest through its enforcement of antidiscrimination laws.278 Availability of equitable relief on behalf of the public
allows the EEOC to combat discrimination at a societal level, without

269. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 806 (4th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Kidder,
Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1998).
270. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 813.
271. Id.
272. See id.
273. See infra notes 295-308 and accompanying text.
274. See infra notes 276-94 and accompanying text.
275. See infra notes 295-322 and accompanying text.
276. See EEOC v. Waffle House, 193 F.3d 805, 812 (4th Cir. 1999). These equitable
remedies include, but are not limited to, an injunction prohibiting an employer from
discriminating in the future or an order to carry out anti-discrimination policies. See id.
277. See id. (citing General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 331 (1980)).
278. See General Tel., 446 U.S. at 326.
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undermining the federal policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements.279
Additionally, allowing the EEOC to seek equitable relief to protect the
public interest is consistent with judicial decision-making.280 As Justice
White’s majority opinion in Gilmer recognized, an individual who signs a
binding arbitration agreement is not prevented from filing a charge with the
EEOC.281 Additionally, the majority in Gilmer held that the EEOC is not
prevented from investigating that charge.282 Gilmer recognized that when an
individual signs an arbitration agreement, the EEOC does not lose all power to
enforce anti-discrimination principles.283
Allowing the EEOC to obtain equitable relief on behalf of the public
interest is also consistent with decisions after Gilmer.284 In EEOC v. Harris
Chernin, the Seventh Circuit held that the EEOC could seek injunctive relief
on behalf of the public interest, even after an individual had litigated his claim
following the rationale set forth by the Third Circuit in U.S. Steel.285 However,
in Harris Chernin the Seventh Circuit stated that the EEOC could not seek
relief on the individual’s behalf when the individual had previously litigated
and received an adverse judgment.286 The court stated that it was necessary to
allow the EEOC to seek injunctive relief to adequately enforce antidiscrimination laws for the public interest.287 Therefore, providing for
equitable relief on behalf of the public interest, notwithstanding a binding
arbitration agreement, is consistent with judicial decision-making.
Additionally, permitting injunctive relief promotes the EEOC’s interest in
having access to the judicial process notwithstanding an individual employee’s
agreement to arbitrate.288 In its 1997 Policy Statement, the EEOC stated that
one reason it disapproved of arbitration for employment discrimination claims
was due to the private nature of arbitration.289 By allowing the EEOC to seek

279. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 811-12 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)).
280. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 811-12.
281. See id. (citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32).
282. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
283. Id.
284. See EEOC v. U.S. Steel Corp., 921 F.2d 489, 495 (3d Cir. 1990); see also EEOC v.
Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993). See generally supra notes 185-200 and
accompanying text.
285. Harris Chernin, 10 F.3d at 1291. See supra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
286. See id.
287. See Harris Chernin, 10 F.3d at 1291.
288. See EEOC Notice, supra note 28. One of the reasons that the EEOC opposes mandatory
arbitration agreements in employment discrimination is because it believes that arbitration takes
away from the publicity associated with the judicial process and discrimination claims. Id.
289. See supra notes 154-59.
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relief on behalf of the public interest, an employer’s discriminating behavior is
exposed to the public through the court process.290
Finally, it has been recognized that an individual’s workplace
discrimination suit is not intended to accomplish the EEOC’s interest in
protecting the public.291 Only the EEOC can adequately protect this interest.292
Therefore, the EEOC must have the ability to file its own claim on behalf of
the public interest in enforcing anti-discrimination laws.293
Balancing the strong federal policy favoring arbitration and the EEOC’s
interest in enforcing anti-discrimination principles, it is clear that the EEOC
must have the ability to seek equitable relief on the public’s behalf for the
reasons stated above.294 However, the EEOC’s ability to seek damages on an
individual’s behalf undermines the policy favoring arbitration in a way that
cannot be advocated.
B.

The EEOC Should Not have the Ability to Seek Damages on Behalf of an
Individual who Enters a Binding Arbitration Agreement

A policy barring the EEOC from obtaining a monetary remedy is
beneficial and logical. This policy benefits employers, employees, and the
EEOC in substantial ways. There are several reasons why an individual
monetary remedy should not be allowed in this situation.
1.

Binding Arbitration Agreements: Beneficial to Employers and
Employees

Although many special interest groups do not authorize the use of
mandatory arbitration agreements,295 the number of employers using, or
considering the use of these kinds of agreements is rising.296 In determining

290. Id.
291. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 809 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Harris
Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d at 1291). In Waffle House, the majority held, that, “[I]nterests are broader
than those of the individuals injured by discrimination. . . private litigants cannot adequately
represent the government’s interest in enforcing the prohibitions of federal statutes.” Waffle
House, 193 F.3d at 809 (quoting Harris Chernin, 10 F.3d at 1291).
292. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 811.
293. See generally id.
294. See supra notes 276-93 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 148-72 and accompanying text. These groups include the EEOC, the
National Academy of Arbitrators, and the Dunlop Commission, although the Dunlop Commission
states that there are benefits to binding arbitration agreements. See supra notes 165-72 and
accompanying text.
296. See Spelfogel, supra note 11, at 80. Many employers have been prompted to use
arbitration because it is typically more predictable, faster, and less costly than the judicial process.
See also FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 235-36. Here, Professor FitzGibbon states that “[w]hether
increasing numbers of employers will offer or mandate arbitration to resolve these [employment]
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what remedies should be available to the EEOC when there is a binding
arbitration agreement, it is important to analyze why employers find value in
these agreements.297 Employers use mandatory arbitration agreements because
they want finality in disputes involving their employees.298 If the EEOC is
able to seek monetary damages, arbitration agreements will lose the finality
aspect that makes them appealing to employers.299 If employers realize that
the EEOC has an ability to seek damages on behalf of employees, employers
may discontinue use of these agreements.300
It is important that employers use arbitration agreements because they are
not only beneficial for employers, but they are also beneficial for employees.301
Suppose an employee brings a claim that the employer believes is insignificant
and lacks merit. Due to the EEOC’s backlog, there is a great probability that if
the EEOC decides to pursue the claim, this claim may not receive the EEOC’s
attention for several years.302 The EEOC has extremely limited resources and
a large caseload.303 These two factors combine to make it highly improbable
that an individual could “make an end run around the arbitration
agreement,”304 as was suggested by the majority in Kidder.305 However, given
the EEOC’s large caseload, an alternate forum should be encouraged for the
benefit of all parties, including the EEOC.306 Arbitration agreements actually
help many employees with claims that may not be addressed by the EEOC in
court.307 If agreements are not binding, an employer may recognize the
EEOC’s backlog and realize that an employee filing with the EEOC would

disputes is an open question . . . .” Id. However, it is still recognized that employers are
considering mandatory arbitration as one option in resolving work-related disputes. See id.
297. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text. Some of the major reasons that
employers use mandatory arbitration agreements are because they can be cost-efficient and
speedy, when compared with the judicial process. Additionally, employers like the finality of
mandatory arbitration agreements. See id.
298. See id.
299. Notwithstanding limited judicial review of arbitration awards, employers use arbitration
agreements with a belief that after the arbitration process has ceased, the claim has been resolved
with finality. If the EEOC is able to seek damages, this would not be the case. See generally
note 184 and accompanying text.
300. See generally FitzGibbon, supra note 16, at 248.
301. See St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 7. Professor St. Antoine summarized that, “The case
for allowing mandatory arbitration—permitting employers to condition employment upon an
employee’s agreement to arbitrate rather than litigate workplace claims, including statutory rights
against discrimination—is counter-intuitive and highly practical.” Id.
302. See generally McArthur, supra note 56, at 882.
303. See generally <http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/all.html>. Between 1992 and 1998 the EEOC
has received between approximately 72,000 and 92,000 cases each year. Id.
304. See EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1998).
305. See id.
306. See St. Antoine, supra note 13, at 7.
307. See id.
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likely become lost in thousands of claims waiting to be investigated and
litigated.308 Employees are protected by the binding nature of arbitration
agreements, because this assures a forum in which they may proceed with all
employment discrimination claims.
2.

Barring the EEOC’s Pursuit of a Monetary Remedy: Enforcing AntiDiscrimination Principles and Enforcing Agreements to Arbitrate

Barring the EEOC from seeking damages on behalf of an employee who
has signed a binding arbitration agreement is also consistent with judicial
decisions. The majority opinions in Mitsubishi309 and Gilmer,310 advocate the
arbitration of statutory claims, unless Congress demonstrates a statutory intent
not to allow arbitration.311 In Gilmer and Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court
described the healthy regard for the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
. . .,” demonstrating that this policy would be undermined if the Court did not
enforce the agreements to arbitrate.312
When the EEOC is trying to obtain damages on an individual’s behalf, the
EEOC’s interest in protecting the public is minimal.313 In Waffle House, the
majority repeated the statement from Gilmer that the EEOC could investigate
an individual’s claims of discriminatory behavior.314 Additionally, in Harris
Chernin, the court recognized that the EEOC could obtain relief on behalf of
the public interest when an individual had previously litigated a claim.315 The
court in Harris Chernin allowed the EEOC to seek only equitable relief, stating
that this relief adequately fulfilled the EEOC’s goal of protecting the public
interest from workplace discrimination.316 Although the problem involving a
binding arbitration contract is different from a situation where an individual
has litigated a claim, the implication from the Harris Chernin decision is that
equitable relief is sufficient to protect the public interest.317

308. See id.
309. See supra notes 89-102.
310. See supra notes 118-43.
311. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 646 (1985).
Here, the court states that if there is nothing in the legislative history or the text precluding
arbitration as a remedy, it should not be precluded. Id. See also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991).
312. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Const.
Co., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
313. See generally EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1998).
314. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 811 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 32).
315. See EEOC v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 10 F.3d 1286, 1291 (7th Cir. 1993).
316. Id.
317. Id.
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Additionally, courts have demonstrated that there is no longer a justified
fear or suspicion regarding arbitration.318 Several courts have recognized that
there are safeguards in place to ensure fairness.319 As long as these safeguards
continue to be in place, there is no reason why these arbitration agreements
should not be enforced.
It is true that barring the EEOC from seeking damages on behalf of an
individual who has signed a binding arbitration contract does take away one of
the EEOC’s methods of enforcing anti-discrimination principles.320 Under the
proposed solution, however, the EEOC is still able to seek injunctive relief on
behalf of the public interest.321 It follows that this should be an adequate
remedy to protect the public interest when an employee has signed a binding
arbitration agreement.
Additionally, if employees entering a binding
arbitration agreement are able to gain remedies through the EEOC, it will
destroy the finality and efficiency purposes for having the agreement in the
employer’s eyes.322
V. CONCLUSION
The proposed solution is fair for all parties involved in the scenario
beginning this Comment. It ensures that the employee’s termination because
of her race may be vindicated by the EEOC’s pursuit of equitable relief. This
type of relief also enables the EEOC to protect the public and enforce federal
anti-discrimination provisions. At the same time, enforcement of the
agreement to arbitrate strengthens the federal policy promoting arbitration, as
well as allowing each party to pursue his or her own interests efficiently and
justly while still resolving the claim with finality.
Allowing the EEOC to pursue only equitable relief on behalf of the public
interest when an individual has signed a binding arbitration agreement is a
solution that is also consistent with judicial decision-making.323 It is also
beneficial to the EEOC, employers, and employees.324 Therefore, the solution
has a substantial chance of being successfully implemented at the national
level. However, in order for this solution to work, it is important to realize that
employers must take safeguards to ensure fairness, efficiency, and due process

318. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 (1985)).
319. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. In the FAA, there are provisions providing
for judicial review of arbitration decisions. Id. Additionally, the NYSE has adopted its own
regulations to ensure fairness in arbitration. See generally Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-31.
320. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 280-83 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 307-08.
323. See supra notes 280-87.
324. See supra notes 295-319.
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for all parties.325 There have already been steps taken to ensure this fairness in
the FAA and the NYSE rules regarding arbitration.326 The suggestions made
by the Dunlop Commission would also assist employers in ensuring that
arbitration is fair to all parties.327
This solution should be implemented on a national level because it
involves arbitration in employment, a national issue.328 Because the EEOC
enforces anti-discrimination practices throughout the nation it is very important
to have a uniform implementation of remedies when the EEOC seeks relief in
the context of a binding arbitration agreement. There is also a substantial
public interest in stopping employment discrimination that should be treated
equally throughout the United States.329 Thus, as Judge Feinberg opined in
Kidder, the decision should be regulated by statute or by the Supreme Court to
ensure its uniformity.330
JULIE L. WATERS

325. See generally Dunlop Report, supra note 165.
326. See id. at 31.
327. See id.
328. See EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 304 (2d Cir. 1998) (Feinberg, J.,
concurring).
329. Id.
330. Id.
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